Azerbaijan: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report | Freedom House (2024)

header3 Executive Summary

Authoritarianism persisted in Azerbaijan in 2023. The presidential administration wielded significant power and showed little interest in genuine democratic change. Both the national legislature and local municipalities operated under the influence of the executive branch and therefore were unable challenge presidential administration. The dominance of the executive branch over both the legislative and judicial branches eroded effective checks and balances. Authorities also tightly controlled the media’s access to governmental information. The Milli Majlis, Azerbaijan’s unicameral parliament, often supported President Aliyev’s decisions and failed to hold the executive branch accountable. An anticorruption initiative launched in 2019 lost momentum in 2023. After a number of prominent officials were charged with corruption in 2022, only low-ranking officials faced corruption charges in 2023.1

Nationalist sentiments, fueled by Azerbaijan’s triumph over Armenia in 2020’s 44-Day War, persisted in 2023, elevating President Aliyev’s political standing. His approval ratings surged following the swift military operation that successfully reclaimed the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region in late September.2 Almost all Azerbaijanis, including civil society, opposition parties, and the media, supported the military operation. The trauma of the Nagorno-Karabakh War fought in the early 1990s, which subjected Azerbaijanis to extensive destruction, massacres, ethnic purges, and the displacement of over 600,0003 Azerbaijani citizens, drove support for 2023’s military operations.4

The government maintained its tight control of domestic politics and continued to suppress the opposition. Opposition figures faced detentions, torture, and false charges throughout the year. A new law on political parties that the parliament passed in January gave the government the power to dissolve any political party that fails to register at least 5,000 members.5 The law threatened the continued existence of major opposition parties like the Republican Alternative (REAL) Party, Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXCP), and Musavat, which were all initially denied registration by the Ministry of Justice over missing information or clerical errors in their member lists. Although the ministry eventually accepted these parties’ revised member lists, the registration process underscored the government’s tight control over the political process.6

Throughout the year, civil society continued to face intimidation and pressure from law enforcement. Some activists faced arrest, mistreatment, and imprisonment based on false accusations. Although the government dropped reportedly bogus charges against some NGOs, many human rights advocates believe these actions do not signal a shift in the government’s hostile, repressive approach to civil society. Environmental protests erupted against plans to construct an artificial lake to hold wastewater that contains cyanide from a goldmine in Soyudlu village.7 The police broke up the demonstrations and arrested several villagers, which sparked widespread outrage.8 Marginalized groups, such as the LGBT+ community, continued to face discrimination. Some LGBT+ activists said they faced physical and emotional abuse while in police custody.9

The media landscape remained restrictive and the government did not respect press freedom. Journalists encountered intimidation, threats, and detentions, particularly when reporting on the environmental demonstrations in Soyudlu.10 Independent journalists continued to raise concerns about the 2021 Media Law and many urged for its repeal. Critics believe the law threatens freedom of expression and the existence of independent media outlets, and that it could be used as a smokescreen to curb dissent and target journalists who criticize the government. Journalists and activists who opposed the war in Karabakh also faced threats from the State Security Service (DTX) this year.11 At least five people were detained due to their stance against the war.12 In November, the government began a crackdown on independent media that led to the detentions of at least nine journalists from Abzas Media and Kanal 13 on bogus charges.13

The judiciary remained under the executive’s influence and often made biased rulings against the government’s critics. Judges frequently collaborated with prosecutors, law enforcement, and security agencies to stifle dissent. Human rights defenders reported facing a threat of being removed from the Bar Association.14 Political prisoners endured severe health problems and authorities restricted their access to medical care.15 Released political prisoners struggle to resume their normal lives as some are not able to return back to their employment because of prison time in their background.16

Local government continued to face pressing challenges that stymied its democratic progression. Local municipalities were marred by inefficiencies including bureaucratic delays, limited resources, and outdated operational models. City/town executive chiefs who are directly appointment by Azerbaijani President maintain significant authority and intervene local municipal governance structures, leading to the centralization of power. Moreover, corruption pervades local governance. Several local officials, especially executive heads, have been accused of corruption, which has eroded public trust and raised questions about the integrity and transparency of local government. While some low-level officials have been charged with corruption, extensive reforms are needed to make local government more effective.17

Tensions persisted around Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Azerbaijani protesters, with government support, continued their demonstrations on the Lachin Corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with the outside world, until late April.18 The protests disrupted the transportation of food, medicine, and other essentials to Nagorno-Karabakh.19 In February, the International Court of Justice directed Azerbaijan to implement all available measures to guarantee the uninterrupted transit of people, vehicles, and goods through the Lachin Corridor in both directions.20 In April, the Azerbaijani Border Service established a checkpoint at the entrance to the Lachin road on the border with Armenia. Baku reported that the checkpoint was established to halt the unauthorized movement of personnel, ammunition, mines, and other military gear from Armenia to its military units within Azerbaijan’s borders.21 In June, Azerbaijani troops attempted to hoist an Azerbaijani flag on the Hakari bridge connecting Armenia and Azerbaijan.22 However, they were pushed back by Armenian border guards who responded with gunfire. Following the clash, Azerbaijan halted all movement through the Lachin Corridor, including humanitarian aid from the Red Cross, and suggested the Agdam road as an alternative.23

The situation escalated rapidly in September when two landmines planted by Armenia’s security forces killed several Azerbaijani police officers and civilians in the Khojavend district of Azerbaijan.24 Soon after the mine blasts, Azerbaijani armed forces attacked Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan gained full control of the region, citing the internationally recognized borders as a justification. As a result, the breakaway government disbanded and nearly all Armenians left Nagorno-Karabakh.25 Azerbaijan encouraged Armenians to remain, ensuring them of their rights and asserting that the government would be inclusive of Armenians. In October, the government revealed plans for the creation of municipalities in Armenian-majority areas of Karabakh.26 Azerbaijan also faces major logistical challenges in the region, including the urgent need to de-mine and rebuild critical infrastructure that was completely destroyed after Armenian paramilitaries took the control of areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.27 Demining and infrastructure development have been difficult tasks to accomplish since Baku gained control of most of the region after the 44-Day War in 2020.28

Azerbaijan: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report | Freedom House (2024)

References

Top Articles
Latest Posts
Article information

Author: Arielle Torp

Last Updated:

Views: 5502

Rating: 4 / 5 (41 voted)

Reviews: 80% of readers found this page helpful

Author information

Name: Arielle Torp

Birthday: 1997-09-20

Address: 87313 Erdman Vista, North Dustinborough, WA 37563

Phone: +97216742823598

Job: Central Technology Officer

Hobby: Taekwondo, Macrame, Foreign language learning, Kite flying, Cooking, Skiing, Computer programming

Introduction: My name is Arielle Torp, I am a comfortable, kind, zealous, lovely, jolly, colorful, adventurous person who loves writing and wants to share my knowledge and understanding with you.